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Abstract. Data deduplication is a key technique to improve storage efficiency in cloud computing. By pointing redundant 
files to a single copy, cloud service providers greatly reduce their storage space as well as data transfer costs. Despite of 
the fact that the traditional deduplication approach has been adopted widely, it comes with a high risk of losing data 
confidentiality because of the data storage models in cloud computing. To deal with this issue in cloud storage, we first 
propose a TEE (trusted execution environment) based secure deduplication scheme. In our scheme, each cloud user is 
assigned a privilege set; the deduplication can be performed if and only if the cloud users have the correct privilege. 
Moreover, our scheme augments the convergent encryption with users’ privileges and relies on TEE to provide secure 
key management, which improves the ability of such cryptosystem to resist chosen plaintext attacks and chosen 
ciphertext attacks. A security analysis indicates that our scheme is secure enough to support data deduplication and to 
protect the confidentiality of sensitive data. Furthermore, we implement a prototype of our scheme and evaluate the 
performance of our prototype, experiments show that the overhead of our scheme is practical in realistic environments. 
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1 Introduction 
Since Google first put forward the concept of “cloud computing” in 2006, cloud computing has drawn wide attention from 
industry and academia. With the development of hardware virtualization technology, the availability of high-capacity 
networks as well as the low-cost of computing resources and storage devices, cloud computing is capable to virtualize the 
computing infrastructure (computer networks, servers, storage, applications and service) and put them together to form a 
shared pool of configurable resources, which can provide users with a variety of computing and storage services which are 
seemingly unlimited capacity. By this paradigm, users can reduce their computing cost, while enjoying rich and convenient 
cloud services. However, as cloud computing becomes more popular than ever, the data stored in the cloud begins to 
increase sharply, bringing the difficulty of managing a massive amount of data.  
Deduplication [1,26] was introduced to reduce the storage and network communication requirements in cloud 
computing. It is a specialized data-compression technique that aims to eliminate duplicate copies of data. Each piece of 
duplicate data is retained and an indexing scheme is designed so that all duplicate copies refer to that single instance. 
Therefore, if cloud users attempt to upload a file (block) that is already in the system, the cloud system will reuse the old 
file (block) and mark the users as one of the owners of the file (block).  
Although deduplication has proven to be efficient in cloud computing, how to preserve security and privacy is a critical 
challenge. As data owners upload their data to the cloud, they lose control of the outsourced data: data owners cannot 
guarantee the secure management of their data in remote storage systems. Therefore, using encryption technology to protect 
the security of data seems to be an effective solution. Unfortunately, data deduplication is incompatible with traditional 
encryption methods. The purpose of data deduplication is to prevent the same data from being stored repeatedly; however, 
traditional encryption encrypts the same data with different keys and outputs different ciphertexts, which effectively 
disables data deduplication. To balance storage efficiency and data privacy, convergent encryption (CE) was first proposed 
by Douceur et al. [2] as a workaround. It is a deterministic scheme in which a plaintext  is encrypted by 
, 	 |	 , where  is a cryptographic hash function,  is a deterministic symmetric-encryption such 
as AES or DES, and  is the resulting ciphertext. In this way, identical plaintext will be encrypted into identical ciphertext, 
which enables the compatibility between data deduplication and encryption. In addition, to achieve effective access control 
in cloud storage, a protocol called proofs of ownership (PoW) [3] was introduced to verify the identity of data users. 
Supposing that a user Alice requests for some data stored in the cloud, she must certify her ownership of the data to the 
cloud service provider (CSP); if PoW is successful, Alice will receive a permission to perform duplicate checking and 
access the data; otherwise the access request will be rejected.  
Both PoW and CE are widely used in deduplication systems [4-6], which rely on the aid of additional independent servers 
(also referred to as third party). All the systems are based on one assumption: the independent servers are reliable and 
secure. However, such a strong assumption is very difficult to realize in a commercial context. The trusted execution 
environment (TEE) [7] is one option for preserving security and privacy. The execution environment can be divided into 
two worlds as depicted in Fig. 1. The first one is the Rich Execution Environment (REE), which also is called as Normal 
World Execution Environment. In a real environment, the REE is an ordinary OS responsible for managing hardware and 
software resources of the device. The application running on REE is referred to as CA. The second world is the TEE in 
which Secure OS runs. Corresponding to the CA in the REE, we call the application on the TEE as trustlets, which is a 
secure application signed by the user and the access verification must be performed before loading into TEE. 
In this two different worlds, while CA requests for cryptographic operations, the key generation or storage assistance 
 
Fig 1 Overview of TEE components
from trustlets, it must be licensed by the user and with the help of Monitor mode, CA cannot catch any sensitive information 
from trustlets during the interaction. In the meantime, TEE offers a secure communication side-channel between the 
external peripheral and the processor, which avoids the malware invading TEE by intercept the input and output.  
In this paper, we propose a secure deduplication scheme that resorts to TEE for key management; specifically, TEE is 
used to replace third party servers. Our scheme restricts cloud users with insufficient privileges from accessing privileged 
data through a PoW protocol. In our approach, each user is assigned with a set of privileges during the system setup phase. 
While a user attempts to upload a file to the cloud, he/she needs to generate a privilege-based authentication code with the 
assistance of TEE. According to the authentication code, CSP determines whether the user has the right to perform a 
duplicate check or a PoW operation; only the user who proves his ownership of the file can retrieve the file. Such a change 
makes the scheme significantly more resistant to Man-in-the-Middle attacks and brute-force guessing attacks. 
1.2      Contributions 
Building on the above insights, our system makes several contributions, stated as follows: 
 We present a scheme to achieve secure deduplication. Users can encrypt their data by semantically secure encryption, 
and the server can check users` access permission of a file on basis of the privileges that users hold.   
 We adopt TEE to perform encryption in the client side. Thanks to the special key-management mechanism of TEE, 
the scheme is in strict compliance with encryption. 
 We implement our scheme to show that it improves security and incurs lower overhead compared to previous 
deduplication schemes. 
1.3     Organization 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe related works. In section 3, we propose the 
system model and introduce the system goal for our scheme. In section 4, the implementation of our scheme is presented. 
The security analysis and performance evaluation for our scheme are shown respectively in section 5 and section 6. Finally, 
we conclude in section 7. 
2 Related work 
2.1 Convergent encryption with deduplication 
Convergent encryption was proposed to enable both file-level deduplication [2] and block-level deduplication [8] with 
encrypted data, it is a special case of message-locked encryption (MLE) [9], which also presents a new security definition 
called “PRV$-CDA” ( PRV and CDA stand for indistinguishability of random numbers and chosen distribution attack 
respectively ) and proved CE is to strictly meet PRV$-CDA. However, most of the storage architectures have their 
limitations and difficulties in direct adoption, since these programs are craving for third-party assistance. 
Puzio et al. [10] presented a secure block-level deduplication scheme called “ClouDedup”, which introduces a third-
party server in charge of access control. Data owner first encrypts each data block with CE, then delivers it to the third-
party server to perform additional encryption. Stanek et al. proposed a scheme that only deduplicates popular files and 
introduced an index sever to keep track of popular data [11]. Li et al. considered a hybrid cloud architecture for secure 
authorized deduplication, which takes a private cloud as the auditor and key depository [12]. Bellare et al. proposed a 
system called DupLESS that implants an additional secret into the key generation process of CE [13], which is provided 
by the third parties. Subsequently, Duan showed an “Encryption with Signature” (EWS) scheme [14] that is similar to 
DupLESS, which is built upon an RSA-based threshold signature scheme [15-17], and generates the convergent key based 
on threshold signature with the help of a third-party server or other users. Although the third-party server is “honest-but-
curious” in these proposals, if the server is comprised, it may lead a Man-in-the-Middle attack to the users. Recently, Zhang 
et al. proposed their scheme as HealthDep [31], which aimed at performing the EMRs deduplication and reduce storage 
cost. Kambo and Sinha also proposed the secure deduplication mechanism based on Rabin CDC and MD5, which allowed 
to process the data chunks for encrypted data on cloud [32]. 
2.2 Proof-of-ownership with deduplication 
In 2011, Halevi et al. proposed the notion of “proof-of-ownership” (PoW) for secure deduplication system [3], which is 
somewhat similar to proofs of retrievability (PoRs) [18,19] and proofs of data possession (PDPs) [20] that achieve an 
opposite result. While the latter two consider the client as the prover rather than the server, the former focuses on proving 
the ownership of the client to the server. Recently, other proposals consider different implementations are discussed 
diffusely. Jin et al. combined PoW with proxy re-encryption (PRE), which not only supports deduplication, but also reduces 
the overhead effectively [21]. Ng et al. proposed the combination of public key cryptography together with PoW [22]. In 
his scheme, files are encrypted at client side and decryption keys are distributed among a specific group of users. Chen et 
al. proposed a model of message-locked proof of ownership, which provides secure deduplication and random block 
accessing etc. [23]. However, the overhead of key management is difficult to meet business requirements.  
3 System model 
In this section, we describe our scheme. Firstly, we introduce the cryptographic primitive and the notions we defined in 
this paper. Secondly, we introduce the adversary model. Then, the design goal of our scheme is described. Lastly, we 
describe our scheme in detail. 
3.1 Preliminaries 
1) Terminology: In this subsection, we describe the notions we have introduced to this paper, which can be listed as Table 
1. 
2) Cryptographic primitives: In this subsection, we also present all algorithms of the cryptographic primitive in this paper.  
Collision-resistant hash functions: A collision-resistant hash function : 0,1 ∗ → 0,1 ∗  that it is computationally 
infeasible to find two different values  and  that satisfy 	 	 . 
One-way collision-resistant trapdoor function:   is a cryptographic function with trapdoor 1  as : 0,1 ∗
0,1 → 0,1 ∗ that it is computationally infeasible to find two different values x and y that satisfy x	 , k 	
	 y	 , k , or find two different keys  and  that satisfy x	 , 	 	 x, . 
Keyed-hash message authentication codes: A keyed-hash message authentication code : 0,1 ∗ 0,1 →
0,1 ∗ is a deterministic hash function that takes an input  as well as a key , outputs a value . 
Deterministic symmetric encryption functions: A deterministic symmetric encryption function : 0,1 ∗
0,1 → 0,1  is a deterministic function that takes a key  as well as a plaintext , outputs a ciphertext . 
Deterministic symmetric decryption functions: A deterministic symmetric decryption function : 0,1
0,1 → 0,1 ∗ is a deterministic function that takes a key  as well as a ciphertext , outputs a plaintext . 
3.2 Adversarial model 
In the adversarial model, we consider the potential threats from both internal adversaries and external adversaries. The goal 
of the malicious adversaries is to get the trust of CSP and access the file stored in the cloud. We assume that the CSP is 
honest-but-curious, anyone who wants to access the file must follow the protocol negotiated in section 3.4. 
Internal adversaries. 
1) Rational CSP: We assume that CSP is honest-but-curious. However, in the case of increasing their profits in the 
system, they may deviate from the predefined protocol. Furthermore, the CSP, as well as some malicious insiders 
working for the CSP, may violate the confidentiality of the outsourced data to retrieve users’ privacy. 
External adversaries. 
1) Hardware destroyer: The hardware destroyer targets to break the confidentiality of outsourced data by compromising 
the user’s local device remotely. Such adversaries are unable to physically access users' device generally, but in the 
users' inadvertent, they may achieve their plot by intercepting the I/O operations on users’ device. 
2) Online adversaries: Such adversaries can eavesdrop on communication between CSP and users. Besides, they may 
disguise as users and attempt to forge the authentication code to cheat CSP. 
For a detail security analysis against these adversaries is discussed in section 5 respectively. 
3.3 Our design goals 
The design objectives of our scheme can be summarized as follows: 
Table 1. The notions in our scheme. 
Symbol Description 
CSP Cloud computing service provider 
TEE Trusted Execution environment 
Ӻ Original file belongs to user 
  Convergent key to encrypt the file 
 A privilege set of the user 
  Privilege key to calculate authentication code 
Correctness.  Each user can access the outsourced file if and only if he/she has the corresponding files and privileges, an 
authentication code based on the file and privilege being necessary when the user requests for the file. 
Soundness.   A malicious user without the complete file is unable to pass the ownership checking protocol. Moreover, a 
privileged file with convergent encryption can improve confidentiality of the file and protect it from outside attacks. 
Certainly, it supports for secure cross-user deduplication. 
Secure key management.  All the key is derived from TEE and stored in the shared memory, which means that all the key 
in TEE only can be accessed by authorized members. 
3.4 System design 
In this subsection, we will illustrate our system prototype in four parts. The whole secure deduplication architecture is 






Fig. 2.  Architecture of secure data deduplication. 
1) System setup: Assume that a privilege set , , ⋯ , , ∈ ∗ is predefined. At the same time, each user is 
assigned with a privilege subset , ⊆  and 	 . The symmetric key  for each privilege ⊆  is 
derived from TEE by a shared protocol. A PoW protocol is also defined, it can be described as 	 ，Π , the proof 
algorithm is ←  performed in TEE, while the verify algorithm is Π ←  performed in cloud side. An entry 
table to support data deduplication is also initialized in the cloud.  
2) Data outsourcing:  When a user requests for uploading content to the remote data center, he/she first sends the file 
Ӻ and the encryption privilege set  from CA to TEE. After receiving the file Ӻ and , TEE computes a hash tag 
 based on the file Ӻ and generates the privilege key  according to the received privilege set as ∥
⋯ ∥ ∥ ⋯ ∥ ,  for ∈ ,  is a “dummy message” that is predefined corresponding to  for achieving 
secure encryption. Here, it is taken as the trapdoor in this algorithm. Along with these two values, an authentication code 
 is computed and sent back to the user. Upon receipt of , the user then sends it to the cloud. Once 
the CSP gets the authentication code, it first checks whether the corresponding file exists in its storage. In this context, we 
consider the authentication code as an access key for data deduplication. If the CSP does not possess the authentication 
code , the user is seen as an initial uploader. Otherwise, he/she is considered as a subsequent uploader. The encoding 
algorithm of authentication code generation is shown as algorithm 1. 
3) PoW protocol initialize: If the CSP cannot find the corresponding  in the entry table, the CSP regards the user as 
an initial uploader. Then the CSP will generate a privilege parameter pp puts it into the entry table, after that the CSP 
transmits pp to the user. Then the user sends pp with the file Ӻ to TEE, who first computes the convergent key 
, ,  and encrypts file Ӻ with the key in a deterministic way. A detailed encryption scheme can be shown 
as algorithm 2. Meanwhile, a PoW checking protocol is also activated. In the setup phase of PoW checking protocol, an 
initial value  is computed as the algorithm 4, which is generated using  and  by hash and XOR operation. Later, 
TEE will destroy the convergent key  in local environment and send the encrypted copy  and  back to the user. 
After receiving of  and , the user submits them to cloud.  is stored in the entry table as well as a pointer , 
which is assigned to index the storage path of the cipher file . 
Algorithm 1:  authentication code  generation 
Input:  An outsourced file , the privilege set  and its corresponding  
trapdoor  
Output:  An encrypted value  and the privilege key  
← ; 
	 ; 
for ← 1 to  do 
     	 || 	 ; 
end for 
Algorithm 2:  Convergent encryption 
Input:  An outsourced file , privilege parameter , the privilege key 
 and the file hash value  
Output:  An encrypted file  
← ; 
← , ; 
4) Data update: If the user is identified as a subsequent uploader, the user proceeds to prove his ownership to CSP. A 
PoW protocol is an interactive algorithm that requires the prover and the verifier to achieve together. In this paper, we 
consider the user as a prover while the cloud as a verifier. The detail of the checking protocol is shown as algorithm 4. First, 
the cloud generates a random parameter  as well as a random 2-element subset ← , ,⋯ , ⁄  of the set 
← 1, 2,⋯ ,  , which is the index of the privilege in . Then, the cloud sends them to the user. After received the value 
from the cloud, TEE runs the algorithm ←  to computing ,  and ,  , 
	 , |	 ∈ 	 , ∈ 	  . Then it computes 	 ⊕ ⁄ 	 ⊕  , 	 	 ⊕ 	 	 ⁄ ⊕   and 
commits them to the cloud. Cloud first computes ⊕	   and runs the algorithm Π ←  to checking 
whether  is equal to . If  is unequal to , the updating request will be rejected. Otherwise, the user can access 
Algorithm 3:  Convergent decryption 
Input:  An encrypted file , privilege parameter , the privilege key 
 and the file hash value  
Output:  A decrypted file  
← ; 
← , ; 
the file, decrypts the file by  as algorithm 3, then update it, perform the phase Data outsourcing and PoW protocol 
initialize again. Because the user only needs to hold  in local side rather than the other private information, this reduces 
much storage cost while performing the ownership protocol. 
5) File retrieval: When the user wants to access the outsourced file in the cloud, the user firstly sends a retrieval request 
as well as the file name to the CSP. Upon receiving the file name and the request, the CSP will check whether the user has 
the permission to access the file. If so, the CSP will send back a corresponding cipher . Thus, the user can decrypt the 
cipher by his own convergent key  to get the original file Ӻ. Otherwise, a signal which indicates that the download 
Algorithm 4:  PoW checking protocol 
Input:  The privilege set  and file hash value  
Output:  0 or 1 
User:  
for ← 1 to  do 
, ; 
       end for 
	 ⊕ ; 
send  to cloud; 
end user 
CSP: 
         chooses ← , ,⋯ , ⁄ 	 ⊆ , ← 1, 2,⋯ , ; 
         generate a secure parameter ← 0,1 ∗; 
         send  and  to the user; 
end CSP 
User: 
 for ← 1 to 2⁄  do 
              , ; 
         end for 
         	 ⊕ ⁄ ; 
         ⊕ ; 
         ← , ,⋯ , ⁄  that satisfies ; 
 for ← 1 to 2⁄  do 
 
Fig. 3. The workflow of data deduplication in our scheme. 
request has been rejected will be return to the user. 
The whole steps in our deduplication scheme is shown as Fig. 3. 
4 Implementation 
We turn to describe the detail implementation that we have done for our proposed scheme following the technique described 
in the above algorithm. Our implementation includes two entities as separate C programs. A storage server is standing for 
the CSP to provide file storage service and perform data deduplication. A client is made up by an ordinary operating system 
(interacting with the storage server) and TEE (encrypting files and key management). 
The proposed scheme is implemented using Ubuntu 14.04 LTS as an operating system, the cryptographic operations of 
hashing and encryption are computed by TEE internal API [7] and OpenSSL Library [24]. TEE is built upon a simulation 
environment Open-TEE [25]. The implementation is shown as the algorithms in section 3. 
5 Security Analysis 
Our deduplication scheme includes three entities: the privilege-based authentication code, the convergent encryption and 
PoW protocol. We assume that a privilege-based authentication code is fundamental to performing a duplicate check, while 
the PoW protocol and convergent encryption is aimed at guaranteeing the data confidentially and storage efficiency. In our 
assumption, they are secure enough to support our proposed deduplication scheme. Next, we will show that our scheme is 
secure to resist attacks we discussed in section 3.2. 
5.1 Uniqueness of an authentication code 
 An authentication code is aimed at preventing the malicious user who without any privilege from accessing to the file. As 
we have shown in section 3.4, if a user attempts to interact with the cloud, an authentication code is required to be yielded 
through the corresponding file Ӻ and the privilege set . Without the file Ӻ or , it is impossible to yield a valid 
authentication code to request for duplicate checking. Next, let's consider such an active attack from two different scenarios: 
1) We assume that an adversary who is a previous uploader. 2) We assume that an adversary who covets the outsourcing 
file but without the information of the file and the encryption privilege. We can formalize above the process by an 
interactive game between the challenger  and the adversary .  
1） Assuming as the first scenario, the challenger  and the adversary  satisfy the following conditions, 
respectively. 
Setup: In the first case,  is a previous uploader. Thus,  holds the privilege set , which is necessary for 
calculating the authentication code, and the file  that before update. Challenger  runs the algorithms 1 and 2 to 
forge the privilege key , but  knows nothing about the trapdoor for generating . 
Hash query:  submits the file  to challenger , then  computes the hash value of  as 
. 
Privilege key query:  submits its privilege set  to . According to the privilege set,  searches for . If  
exists in the query, return . Otherwise, returns  a forged privilege key . 
Output: According to the privilege key  and the hash value , an authentication code can be forged as 
α  by . If , α , the adversary  is said to win the game. 
However, as mentioned before in section 4, the privilege key  is calculated by a one-way collision-resistant 
trapdoor function, which is collision-resistant. At the same time, an updated file  is modified by the latest uploader that 
is different from the previous one. Thus, α  is impossible to be forged and equal to the correct one  with non-
negligible probability. 
2） In the second scenario, the adversary  holds the outsourcing file  but without the information of the file 
and the encryption privilege. The challenger  can run algorithms as above and assign  with a privilege set 
. 
Hash query:  submits the file  to challenger , then  computes a forged hash value of  as . 
    Privilege key query:  submits its privilege set  to . According to the privilege set,  returns a privilege key 
. 
Output: According to the privilege key  and the hash value , an authentication code can be forged as 
 by . If , , the adversary  is said to win the game. 
Obviously, the above assumption is invalid since that 	 . Thus,  is impossible to be forged and equal to 
the correct one . 
5.2 Safety of encryption key 
In this proposal, different kinds of keys are derived to satisfy different encryption algorithms. The encryption keys we have 
involved are: the privilege key , the convergent key . We suppose such a scenario that there exist a hardware adversary is 
dedicating to despoiling all private information. If the encryption keys are preserved in local device, it is apparently that these 
keys are prone to be held by the attacker. In order to solve this conundrum, we resort to TEE to support key management. Since 
TEE can be viewed as a black-box from the outside world, illegal attacker is unable to learn the keys in TEE. Meanwhile, it is 
also forbidden to peek the internal implementation of TEE from outside, which means that it is invisible to outside attacker what 
kind of encryption algorithm we have chosen. Thus, even if the attacker is peeked at the information stored in TEE, the attacker 
is unable to purloin anything in an illegal way. 
5.3 Confidentially of outsourcing data 
Any file before it is outsourced to the CSP, the convergent encryption is invoked to support for secure data deduplication in the 
cloud. However, the data encrypted with such cryptosystem is unable to achieve the goal of semantic security. The notion of 
semantic security is proposed by Goldwasser and Micali [27]. A cryptosystem is semantically secure if a polynomial-time 
adversary who is given the ciphertext Ç of a message m as well as the length , he/she cannot better distinguish any partial 
information of  than the other polynomial-time adversary who only holds  without Ç. It is a practical definition because it 
can be applied to a variety of attack modes such as chosen plaintext attack (CPA), chosen ciphertext attack (CCA1), and adaptive 
chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2), which can be categorized as brute-force attack. Clearly convergent encryption is not satisfied 
with semantically secure as it leaks message equality. Recent research also shows that convergent encryption is suffering from 
these attacks [29-31]. To overcome these challenges, we improve the convergent encryption in section 3 and name it as privilege-
based convergent encryption. Next, we will discuss the confidentiality of data that encrypted with our scheme and how it can 
withstand brute-force attacks. 
The ciphertexts stored in the cloud is encrypted with a privilege-based convergent encryption, which is based on different 
privilege keys with the privilege parameter. While the traditional convergent encryption just relies on the file’s hash value to get 
a ciphertext, a privilege-based convergent encryption combines the privilege parameter with the file’s hash value to compute the 
convergent key , ,  . As we have shown before,  is kept in TEE, and it is unknown to the 
adversary unless the entire set of privilege keys is published. Therefore, we consider that our construction is semantically secure 
and is effective to against CPA, CCA1 and CCA2 since the adversary cannot obtain the encryption method. 
5.4 Correctness of PoW checking protocol 
In the PoW checking protocol, we generate the proof value and verify value by randomly choosing the user’s privileges and 
the hash value of the file that he/she holds. Namely, the proof value for performing PoW protocol is always different every time. 
Simultaneously, since these hash values are XORed with each other, and then XORed with the security parameter again, which 
makes sure that the adversary from outside world cannot catch any information about the original privilege set and the hash value 
of the file if the adversary did not capture the information of security parameter. Therefore, any attempt to subvert the pow protocol 
by forging the proof value will fail. 
6 Performance evaluation 
In this section, we provide a performance evaluation of our prototype. The overhead of data deduplication is affected by many 
factors, we chose two most important factors among these factors. One is the impact of file sizes, and the other is the number 
of stored files. In the following experiments, we evaluate the upload process in different phases: 1) Authentication code 
generation; 2) File encryption; 3) Duplicate check. At the same time, we compare our PoW proposal with other schemes, and 
then we show the time-consuming with different privileges and the storage cost of it. All the experiments were performed on 
a device with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3230M CPU processor running at 2.60 GHz and 4 G memory running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 
64-Bit Operation System. 
6.1 Time consumption of different file sizes 
To evaluate the effect of different file sizes on time consuming on different phases, we choose five different size files (5 
for each type), the size of file ranges from 10 MB to 200 MB. We record the time breakdown in different phases with 
specific file size. The average time consuming of each phase test by different file sizes are plotted in Fig. 4. From the 
figure, we can see that the time consuming of authentication code generation, file encryption and duplicate checking is 
increasing linearly with different sizes. Moreover, most of the time consumption is distributed in the file encryption phase. 
For an outsourced file that its size is 50 MB, it costs less than 1s in encryption while the authentication code generation only 
need 0.15s. However, if the file size increases to 200MB, the time consuming of file encryption has a sharply growth while it 
compares to the authentication code generation. 
6.2 Time consumption of storing different number of files 
To evaluate the effect of the number of files to time consuming on different phase, we choose 400 10MB unique files and 
upload them to the cloud continuously. Then we record the time breakdown of the whole files in different phases. As is 
shown in Fig. 5, the time consuming of each phase scales linearly along with the number of files. The time consuming of 
duplicate checking and authentication code generation are far less than the cost of file encryption.  
6.3 Time consumption comparison in different PoW with different privilege set 
The number of privileges in the privilege set has a crucial influence on the time-consuming of PoW checking protocol. In 
this experiment, we choose five different privilege sets that with different number of privileges from 10 to 100. According 
to the complete PoW protocol, the time consumption can be divided into initial time consumption, proof time consumption 
and verify time consumption, the experimental results are shown in Table 2. Since the number of elements in our chosen 
privilege set is only incremented by 10 each time, we can see that the time consuming increasing inconspicuous throughout 
the experiment, the time consumption in these three phases is always floats up and down in 0.0020s, 3.1s and 0.000016s, 
respectively. 
 
Fig 4 Time breakdown for different file size
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Table 2. Time cost with different number of privileges. 
Number of 
privileges 
Time Cost (Sec) 
Initial value Proof Verify 
10 0.0020 3.1889 0.000016 
20 0.0021 3.1805 0.000016 
50 0.0027 3.1931 0.000012 
6.4 Time consumption comparison of different PoW schemes 
To show that our proposed PoW scheme is efficient and elastic, we implement other three schemes of Halevi, et al. [3] 
(POW), Zheng, et al [28] (POSD) and Chen, et al [23] (3R-PoOR) for a comparison. In our implementation, we choose 25 
unique files in different sizes: 32MB, 64MB, 128MB, 256MB, 512MB (5 file for each size), and evaluate the average time 
consuming of each scheme with fixed file size. As is shown in Fig. 6, we present the simulation result of different schemes. 
From the result, we can see that our proposal is more efficient than the POW [3] and POSD [28] and closed to the 3R-
PoOR. Besides, we also take the 1GB file for another comparison. In this experiment, we divide the time consuming into 
the user-side and the server-side and define that the testing privilege set with 50 different privileges. The complete 
comparison result is shown in Fig. 7. As we can see, our protocol is obviously better than POW and POSD in both user-
side and server-side. Meanwhile, although the time consuming of our protocol is more than 3R-PoOR at the user side, we 
spend less time on the server side. It costs only about 0.000017s for the 1 GB file, since the value is very small, it cannot 
be visualized in Fig. 7. 
6.5 Storage cost evaluation 
For the user side, the storage cost is affected by the number of privilege that user holds yet is foreign to the size of the 
outsourced file. Regardless of whether the user is the initial uploader or the subsequent uploader, the storage cost is 
identical. In addition to the consumption of user-owned privilege information, the only storage consumption comes from 
the hash value of the outsourced file. In our proposal, while users attempt to upload his file to the cloud or update the 
outsourced file, he/she need to generate the authentication code, the convergent key and prove his ownership to CSP base 
on the privilege set and hash value of the file. Since that we take the SHA-256 hash algorithm to compute the file’s hash 
value, the hash length is 256 bits, which is 32 bytes of storage consumption. For the privilege ∈ ,  it takes 64 bytes 
to store the encryption trapdoor . Namely, users that with  privileges will cost about 64 32 bytes for necessary 
information storage. 
6.6 Communication cost evaluation 
In our proposal, the transaction between users and the cloud runs throughout the whole process, and the communication 
overhead is the result of these interactions. In the authentication code generation phase and the file encryption phase, users 
 
Fig 6 Time consuming comparison of our scheme 3R-PoOR [23]
 
Fig. 7. Time consumption comparison of our PoW protocol, 3R-
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generate the authentication code to request for data outsourcing, then CSP return a privilege parameter  to the users, 
which can assist the users in completing file encryption. Because these two values are consstant, we can regard the cost of 
them as 1 . In the PoW checking protocol, the communication overhead is variable. First, the users send an initial value 
 to the cloud,  is constant so we consider the cost as 1 . However, while the users prove his ownership to the 
cloud, the communication cost changes with the number of the users’ privilege. The communication value is  
	 , 	 , , 	 , the size of ,  and  are constant, so the cost is 1 . While the size of the subset  is 
changeable, it costs about  if the users request for ownership proven. Therefore, the total communication cost is 
5 1 , since that 1  can be ignored, so the cost is . 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a secure deduplication scheme that contains the operations of duplicate checking, proofs of 
ownership and convergent encryption. Only the users who hold legal privilege can perform the above operations. 
Meanwhile, we achieve the end of secure key management by aid of TEE, in which the encryption key cannot be peeped 
by unauthorized adversary. Hence, the outsourced data and encryption key can be safely stored in both cloud side and client 
side. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first data deduplication scheme that based on TEE for secure cloud storage. 
Finally, we perform a security analysis as well as performance evaluation, which shows that our proposal is efficient and 
feasible in practice. 
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